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Abstract
Concern for the plight of whistle-blowing professionals has
resulted in a number of suggestions for designing organizational control
systems to reduce their ethical dilemmas. This paper argues that the
suggestions that have been made for feedback, control systems to protect
the ethical engineer are flawed and based on an inappropriate image of
what organizations are and how they function.
The rational fantasies that have guided these suggested control
systems are contrasted with the decision making behavior actually
observed in organizations, and with the experience of implementing
management information systems. Several examples of management decision
making on engineering issues are presented. The importance of the
process by which managers define an ambiguous situation as a problem,
and the role of organizational power in determining management's defini-
tion of the situation, is emphasized.
Finally, the responsibility of the professional for defining the
framework within which a dialogue on organizational problems are discussed
is related to their development and exercise of power.

At the First National Conference on Engineering Ethics, the keynote
speaker (DeGeorge, 1980) voiced the proposition that organizations
should be designed so that engineers need not be moral heroes.
Westin's (1981) recent collection of case studies concludes with
this same theme. The mechanisms that are proposed include statements
of organizational principles and policies; procedures for filing com-
plaints of possible violations; an impartial, thorough method for con-
ducting investigations; use of fair-hearing procedures; and an objec-
tive decision making process. A strong ombudsman program would be a
companion measure to these formal procedures. In essence, these are
feedback control mechanisms - communication channels designed to effect
an error-reducing control process in the organization. These recommen-
dations can provide valuable and needed improvements in the function-
ing of large organizations. However, it is important to realize the
limitations of these methods of organizational control.
Like the engineer, the management system designer wants to improve
the functioning of an organization through the use of feedback control
systems. While some improvements have been made, many systems are de-
signed and developed but never successfully implemented or used.
Others have too infrequently delivered the improvements that were prom-
ised during their design (Schultz & Slevin, 1975). The question is,
"why?". My own research suggests that the underlying image of what an
The author has benefited from discussions with colleagues David
Whetten, Department of Business Administration and Dan Alpert, Center
for Advanced Study, at the University of Illinois.
-2-
organizatlon is and how an organization functions that guides our ef-
forts at system design is partly at fault (Boland, 1978).
Management system designs and the structural reforms proposed by
Westin and others are based on a rational-bureaucratic ideal of orga-
nizations. The organization is pictured as purposive, directed from
the top by a series of commands to subordinates. It is imagined that
functional units are coordinated in a machine-like fashion. Standard
operating procedures, clearly defined decision making responsibilities
and feedback control systems are used to explain the organization's
daily functioning.
Most importantly, the organization is assumed to be guided by plan-
ning. Planning is a forward looking, intentional process in which
goals are defined, alternatives are examined and courses of action are
chosen based on the highest return to the organization. There may be
some conflict among managers and some decisions may be politically
based, but essentially, we assume there is a logical coherence to the
organization's activities that emanates from its center of management
control. We assume that those higher up on the management ladder see
a bigger picture, reconcile competing claims and values, and responsi-
bly choose a direction for the future. Feedback control mechanisms
are intended to ensure that higher management has all the relevant
data in exercising its global understanding and making management de-
cisions.
DeGeorge, for instance, reviewed the responsibility of the Ford
engineers in the Pinto gas tank decision and concluded that their ethi-
cal responsibility was met by providing complete and objective data to
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cop nanagement decision makers. Once the data had been provided, the
valuing of alternative courses of action was a management decision,
not an engineering decision. The decision made by the Ford executives
might have been a good or bad business decision, but the engineer is
not morally responsible for it.
A rational-bureaucratic image of Ford is important to DeGeorge's
conclusion. If no one in Ford's management actually made any decisions
relevant to the Pinto gas tank, if managers who claimed to make such
decisions instead engaged in aimless, wandering conversations, or if
they routinely ignored critical data presented to them, the engineer,
could not so easily dismiss his own responsibility. I do not mean to
single out DeGeorge or Westin because, as I have said, designers of
computer-based and other management systems have also relied primarily
on an image of the management process as being comprehensive, coherent,
intentional and rational. However, the experience of failures and
unmet expectations with computer-based systems suggests that the use
of a rational-bureaucratic image to guide their design is often mis-
taken (Argyris, 1977).
The image of organizations as coherently rational is widely shared
in modern society, almost to the point of being a modern mythology of
organizations. Yet, no matter how firm its ideological foundations,
it is more a flattery to managements than a defensible statement of
what organizations are like. When we look at more recent developments
in the theory of organizations we see a movement away from the rational-
bureaucratic image. Field research that observes management decision
making in action reveals a much more chaotic, much less coherent pro-
cess than we so often imagine.
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ilintzberg's (1973) observations of top managers' daily activities
reveals an unrelenting sequence of brief, isolated events. The manager
encounters one fragmented, disjoint demand for attention after another,
most of which last for only a few minutes or less. The manager's pref-
erence is for action rather than reflection and the image of the
thoughtful superior who surveys the big picture and comprehends how
the whole organization fits together is nowhere to be seen. Cohen and
March (1972), in observing the decision making of management groups,
describe the process as a "garbage can" in which problems, solutions,
and choice opportunities swirl in a chaotic vortex. They see pet solu-
tions that are looking for problems, choices that are looking for ex-
cuses to be made and executives that are looking for things to do.
They do not see the careful definition of problems, the posing of al-
ternative solutions and the rational choice among alternatives that we
so often attribute to the management process.
Carl Weick (1979) concludes from his work that the goals which we
suppose management pursues are often only identified retrospectively
—
after managements have satisfied their primary preference for unreflec-
tive action and find that they must give an account of what they have
done. They must make sense of their action after the fact because it
was not done before the fact. Thus, Weick argues, an evolution-based
theory of organization, emphasizing that most management actions are
random variations which are selectively retained and retrospectively
rationalized is at least as appropriate as rational-bureaucratic
theories that emphasize coherent understanding and pre-planning.
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Finally, Salancik and Pfeffer (1977, 1978) conclude from their
observations of management decision making in a wide variety of settings
that the management process is best understood as the struggle of a
plurality of power positions within the organization, none of which
are based on a global image. Each power group has its own definition
of what the problems faced by the organization really are. These "def-
initions of the problem" are tied to actions each group has power over,
not to an understanding of the whole. Marketing people see problems
of customer satisfaction, market penetration, and product differentia-
tion. Production people see quality control, cost-per-unit, and main-
tenance problems. Finance people see cash flow, capital sources, and
portfolio of investment problems.
Groups have power not because their understanding of the organiza-
tion is coherent, complete or wise, but because they control a resource
seen as critical to its continued functioning. Control over funds,
markets, labor, supplies or information can all be sources of power,
depending on the nature of the environment. What is seen as critical
is primarily socially defined.
We see for example, that the backgrounds of company presidents
changes over time as the critical factors in the environment change
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). In the period from 1940 through 1960 we
saw engineering as the predominant background; from 1960 through 1970
it was marketing that provides presidential training; and from 1970 on
the emphasis has been on financial backgrounds for corporate leaders.
These changes in leadership emphasis and in ways of seeing the orga-
nization's problems are the result of the struggle of power groups
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within the organization in light of a cultural image of rational man-
agement.
Power is not evil and the fact that organizations have multiple,
competing centers of power is not bad. Rather, the responsible exer-
cise of power by various groups within the organization is part of a
necessary process of aligning the organization with the appropriate
factors, resources and problems of its environment—including the tech-
nical, legal, economic and social aspects. The need for the responsi-
ble development and exercise of power in addition to the establishment
of feedback control mechanisms—is the central point of this paper.
Before exploring power and the engineer, an example of recent man-
agement decision making will highlight the more chaotic approaches to
theories of organization that I have just described. General Motors
Corporation is often cited as a paragon of modern management. Their
unique blend of centralized financial control and decentralized opera-
tions developed by Sloan in the 1920 's is widely copied. Yet, even
General Motors can fail to perceive important problems until it is too
late to respond. Their failure to define the 1973 oil embargo as in-
dicating a significant shift in their environment, requiring a redefi-
nition of plans and standards, is a case in point. Joseph Kraft (1980),
intrigued by this apparent failure, investigated how and when General
Motors finally did define the problem of oil shortages as significant,
and decided to produce fuel-economic vehicles. He refers to this as
the "downsizing decision." After interviews with automobile executives,
oil Industry leaders, government regulators, and the top management of
General Motors, he concluded that "nobody seemed altogether sure how
it came about."
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Each executive he interviewed identified different dates, different
committees, different cars being discussed, and different people being
involved in making the "downsizing decision." Kraft concludes that a
Department of Transportation official is probably closest to the facts
when stating: "Nobody at GM could tell you how the downsizing decision
was made because nobody knows. The fact is that GM didn't make the de-
cision by itself. The government helped... (p. 155)." He goes on to
argue that what GM did was respond, in multiple, disjoint ways to a
series of environmental pressures including the fuel-economy standards,
the continued rise in oil prices, and the small cars being produced by
foreign competitors, until, at some point in late 1975, they discovered
that they were involved in a major program of downsizing. Looking
back they could see precedents for smaller cars: the corvair, the
tempest, and so on. They could argue that those experiments were
ahead of their time but now the conditions were right. Another
explanation would be that the earlier attempts were merely random mu-
tations that occur frequently in a decentralized company, and that the
environmental pressure of new federal regulations selected the pattern
of behavior we now call downsizing.
There was no purposeful, coherent plan at work. No comprehensive
vision within which competing claims were valued and "objective data"
were evaluated. Instead, there are a series of fleeting discussions
passing rapidly and irregularly from one isolated topic to another.
The rational-bureaucratic image is a fantasy proposed by those outside
the supposed inner-circle of understanding. It is a fantasy enter-
tained by engineers to avoid their individual responsibility and to
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compensate for their own lack of coherent understanding of what the
organization is doing. Becoming a manager is the major reward avail-
able to an engineer in an organization, and so the rational image is
also a fantasy of the special knowledge that will come at the end of a
successful career.
It's interesting to note that an engineer, Kettering, was actively
working within GM to define the coming of the fuel shortage problem
and the need for fuel efficient cars in the late 1930 's. Yet, the
loss of power by engineers and the gain of power by marketing and
especially finance, never allowed the company to take that definition
of their central problem seriously.
We can see this same theme—that critical decisions will not be
made unless the key power centers define the terms of discussion
appropriately-in the Pinto gas tank case. In Westin's latest book of
cases we see the report of Frank Camps, a Ford engineer involved in
the Pinto windshield design. Here we learn that the windshield design
problem was solved by routing the energy of a head-on impact through
the drive shaft towards the gas tank. So, while the Board of Directors
are debating the costs and benefits of a seven dollar shield for a
rear collision, the company is busily setting in motion a confluence
of events that are otherwise determining the basic integrity of the
Pinto gas tanks. The Board of Directors is not discussing the problem
that way, though. And so no decision will be made about it. As long
as the power centers of marketing and finance define the problem as
one of styling trade-offs or cost-per-unit of production, the Board
will not make any other types of decisions.
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Even if Mr. Camps could relay his fears about the windshield di-
rectly to the Board of Directors, they would still have to redefine
the gas-tank-shield situation in terms of much larger scope, dealing
with a company-wide failure to create a reliable design process, before
they could profitably use his information. That type of problem redef-
inition, challenging the terms with which a situation is being dis-
cussed, comes from the critical exercise of power that engineers should
accept as their responsibility. Feedback control systems are helpful
in aiding the concerned engineer to express his or her doubts, but
unless they speak to a problem within the terms that have been formu-
lated by the power struggle, they will be minimally effective. What
can engineers do? First, they can realize that the exception-based
feedback control mechanisms so often suggested are nice but will not
solve the problems they experience. They are inspired by a fantasy of
rational management that has little relation to real organizations.
Second, they can accept the responsibility to develop and exercise
power within organizations so they can affect the quality of dialogue
and the way of defining situations that emerge from power struggles.
Engineering, with its wide-spread impact on the critical needs of
innovation, productivity and regulatory requirements, has control over
resources that should be an important base of power. In addition,
engineers have other characteristics that tend to enhance power in
organizations. They are professionals with their own language; experts
with control over secrets useful to others. The work of an engineer
is hard to evaluate, especially by the uninitiated. Finally, in one
form or another, engineers have control over information that others
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in the organization need, and they are in a position to create a sense
of obligation in others for sharing that information.
The engineer can be the source of his or her own undoing by failing
to take advantage of their potential for developing a power center in
the organization. To the extent that they allow their work to be pro-
ceduralized and routinized, they lose the basis for developing power.
To the extent that they allow themselves to be physically isolated, with
limited reporting status, they lose the possibility of developing power.
If they allow a narrow definition of their task and responsibilities
to be imposed on their work, they further lose power. And if they al-
low the organization to use outside consultants for non-routine prob-
lems on a regular basis, they will have little left in the way of a
power base.
In order to effectively develop and exercise power, engineers in
organizations can take several positive steps. First, they must estab-
lish themselves as participants in as wide a range of activities within
the organization as possible. They should increasingly insist on the
use of teams in which engineers can play key liaison roles linking dif-
ferent departments together in a common problem focus. They should in-
sist on having participation in these problem solving teams from the
first, early stages of a decision process through its final conclusion.
Engineers should work to develop an effective network of peer com-
munication throughout the organization; avoiding physical isolation
from other engineers and creating opportunities for meeting on a regu-
lar basis to discuss common concerns, and develop positions with re-
spect to them. Finally, they must learn to use their unique control
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over the critical resources of information and innovation to establish
their agenda and concerns as an integral part of the organization's
dialogue on its problems. At times this might require holding back
certain projects or analyses. At other times it may mean sharing
their influence to support another group who will later be in a posi-
tion to reciprocate.
The engineers' control over information need not be exotic or eso-
teric to be effective. Michael Crozier's study of a French cigarette
factory revealed considerable power being wielded by the maintenance
engineers. They exercised this power because the complicated produc-
tion machinery was subject to unexpected breakdowns and they kept their
knowledge of repair solutions secret, under lock and key or in their
own heads (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).
For engineers who would seek to increase their power within orga-
nizations, perhaps the most Important lesson to learn is that change
in organizations is most frequently and effectively instituted by ex-
ternal pressures—not by internal deliberation. It is here that the
engineer is in a very strong position to develop external contacts
which will share their definition of the organizations' problems and
will work to shape the external environment and thereby the forces for
change being placed on the organization. Engineers make a mistake if
they agree to the frequently cited claim that an employee must first
and foremost recognize the organization's right to privacy and oust ex-
haust appropriate organizational channels before sharing troublesome
information with outside parties.- Quite the contrary, concerned engi-
neers enhance their ability to control the dialogue of management if
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they can have their views incorporated into the set of external pres-
sures being put on the organization by legislatures, regulatory agen-
cies, customers, suppliers, and special interest groups.
The engineer cannot retreat behind the shield of management deci-
sion making. What we imagine to be a rational, coherent, comprehensive
management process is a shifting, dynamic struggle between diverse,
partial and incoherent centers of power.
Professional responsibility cannot rest on allegiance to such a
shaky ground. Instead, the engineer must accept responsibility for
participating in the power struggle that is the management process.
Only by creating the terms of the dialogue within which their misgiv-
ings are to be heard can engineers claim to have met their profes-
sional responsibilities.
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